Current Issue : January - March Volume : 2019 Issue Number : 1 Articles : 5 Articles
We aimed at determining the effects of prototype games on older adults attending a rehabilitation program in an elderly house in\nthis work. We conducted an initial case study where two participants underwent a 5-week intervention. Feasibility was assessed by\nexamining recruitment, adherence, and safety. The Tinetti balance test was used as pretest and post test assessments. Results show\nthat adherence was very high and no adverse effects were registered during the sessions. The included participants also reported\nenjoyment during the playtime and exhibited improvements in Tinetti scores. The findings suggest that game-based rehabilitation\ncan be useful for improving balance in elderly people and can be incorporated in a fall prevention program....
In this experiment, we test whether subjectsâ?? responses to variations in the action set in\na dictator game depends on induced group identities. The action set includes choices in which\nthe dictator can either give money to or take money from the other player. As an extension to\nthe anonymous setting, we introduce induced group identities using the minimal group paradigm.\nBased on a dictator game conducted with more than 300 students in Indonesia, we implement a full\nfactorial design in order to analyze the framing of the action set in a varied cultural context and to\nexamine varied prevalence of social norms given a group identity context. If group identity is not\nsalient, we find that participants are slightly more generous when they have an opportunity to give\nto rather than to take from the recipient. However, when participants are matched with in-group\nmembers, this result is reversed and highly significant. The result of differing responses to framing\neffects in within-group interactions compared to a neutral setting are largely ascribed to the varied\ncompliance with existing social norms....
This paper investigates the secrecy and reliability of a communication where the user is assisting an Intrusion Detection System\n(IDS) in detecting the adversaryâ??s attack.The adversary is assumed to be sophisticated such that it can conduct eavesdropping and\njamming attacks.The IDS is equipped with the capability of detecting both of those attacks. Two scenarios were considered; the first\nscenario is that the user is trying to detect the adversary by assisting the IDS, and the second scenario is that the user is equipped\nwith a silent time slot in its communication protocol besides assisting the IDS, in order to provoke the adversary into jamming the\nchannel, thus detecting it with a higher probability. Interestingly, adding the capability of detecting eavesdropping attacks pushed\nthe adversary into conducting jamming attacks much more, thus aiding in detecting the adversary earlier. All of that was modeled\nby means of stochastic game theory, in order to analyze and study the behavior and the interactions between the user and the\nadversary. Results show a major improvement in the first scenario by 188% and an improvement by 294% in the second scenario in\nthe game value when the probability of detecting eavesdropping attacks was 0.3, which represents the payoff that the user gains in\nterms of secrecy and reliability....
In order to improve the operational efficiency, the government can realize\nthe streamlining policy through the mode of government information resource\nsharing. By building government information resources sharing, the\ngovernment breaks the inter-departmental data island. The government\nrealizes the development direction and trend of â??Internet governmentâ?.\nThis paper also takes the information resource sharing as the game process\nbetween the government management department and the information resource\nsharing body, and analyzes the policy and suggestion of the information\nresource sharing in the perspective of game theory by constructing the\nsharing model of the government information resource in the perspective of\ngame theory....
Game-theoretic models are a convenient tool to systematically analyze competitive\nsituations. This makes them particularly handy in the field of security where a company or a critical\ninfrastructure wants to defend against an attacker. When the optimal solution of the security game\ninvolves several pure strategies (i.e., the equilibrium is mixed), this may induce additional costs.\nMinimizing these costs can be done simultaneously with the original goal of minimizing the damage\ndue to the attack. Existing models assume that the attacker instantly knows the action chosen by\nthe defender (i.e., the pure strategy he is playing in the i-th round) but in real situations this may\ntake some time. Such adversarial inertia can be exploited to gain security and save cost. To this end,\nwe introduce the concept of information delay, which is defined as the time it takes an attacker to\nmount an attack. In this period it is assumed that the adversary has no information about the present\nstate of the system, but only knows the last state before commencing the attack. Based on a Markov\nchain model we construct strategy policies that are cheaper in terms of maintenance (switching costs)\nwhen compared to classical approaches. The proposed approach yields slightly larger security risk\nbut overall ensures a better performance. Furthermore, by reinvesting the saved costs in additional\nsecurity measures it is possible to obtain even more security at the same overall cost...
Loading....